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IN THE SUP Rf ME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




CLEARFIELD STA TE BANK, 
Defendant 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Second District Court 
In and for Davis County, State of Utah 
HON. THORNLEY K. SWAN, Judge 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, a Utah corporation, filed suit in the Sec-
ond District Court in and for Davis County, seeking to 
recover damages from Respondent for a claimed breach 
of an agreement to loan money. As a second cause of 
action, the suit alleged wrongful diversion of money from 
Appellant's payroll and equipment obligations to debts 
owed by Appellant to Respondent. Respondent Clearfield 
State Bank, filed a counterclaim <R-18) against Appellant 
for recovery of moneys loaned. Respondent also added 
additional defendants, Smith, Stoker and Mendenhall, 
principals of M&S, and co-signers of the notes evidenc-
ing these loans <R-27). A cross-claim against these addi-
tional defendants was filed by Clearfield State Bank <R-
28), but service was obtained only on Smith as Stoker and 
Mendenhall were not available for service in Utah. 
The trial court submitted three issues to the jury: 
1. Did the defendant on or about August 23, 1963, 
enter into an agreement with the plaintiff to lend 
to plaintiff as and when required by the plaintiff, 
for the purpose of providing finances to carry on 
its work under the terms and provisions of the 
Sub-Contract between plaintiff and Steenberg 
Construction Company, an amount not to exceed 
$50,000.00, by lending to plaintiff the sum of 
$25,000.00 on August 23, 1963, to be due Sep-
tember 15, 1963, and to renew said loan from 
time to time to the date of final payment by 
Steenberg Construction Company? 
2. Whether Respondent breached such agreement. 
3. Damciges resulting from the breach. 
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The jury answered the first two questions in the 
affirmative, and fixed damages at $156,000.00. 
Respondent's counter-claim and cross claim were not 
submitted to the jury, the trial court holding there was 
no issue for the jury <R-81) on the question of liability 
on the counter-claim, and by stipulation it was agreed 
the court could fix attorneys fees without evidence <T-
250). 
Respondent timely filed its motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new 
trial <R-97). After argument, the trial court granted Re-
spondent's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, and denied the alternative Motion for New Trial. 
<R-108). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the jury verdict reinstated. 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment affirmed, upon 
the grounds set forth in the order and judgment <R-108), 
or upon grounds set out in the Statement of Respondent's 
Points on Appeal (R-122). Alternatively, if this Court 
reverses the Judgment, Respondent seeks a new trial upon 
grounds set out in the Statement of Respondent's Points 
on Appeal <R-122). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March of 1963, Vern Smith, Russel Stoker and 
James Mendenhall formed M&S Construction & Engineer-
ing Company, plaintiff and appellant in this case <T-77). 
Such Company is hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
M&S. M&S had no previous history and no evidence was 
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presented as to the net worth of the company as of any 
time. It had started, but not completed, two construction 
jobs other than the one here involved <T-77); none of 
these jobs were completed (T-183, 184). 
Three months after coming into existence M&S 
signed a subcontract on the Lost Creek Dam Project with 
Steenberg Construction Company for a total sum of 
$754,579.00 (Ex. 1). Steenberg Construction Company 
was the low bidder on the project, having a general con-
tract for construction of the dam in Morgan County with 
the Bureau of Reclamation for $2,053,000.00 (Ex. N). 
The cost estimate of the Bureau of Reclamation Engineers 
for the project was $2,794,732.00, being nearly three 
quarters of a million dollars higher than the Steenberg 
bid; the next low bidder, Morrison-Knudson, bid $2,856,-
105.00-an amount in excess of the Engineer's estimate 
<Ex. N). The items subcontracted to M&S were mainly 
earth moving <T-180), and each item of work set out in 
the subcontract corresponded exactly to the identical item 
in the general contract and specifications <T-153) except 
as to price. The earth moving items were bid by Steen-
berg at $925,903.92 (Ex. N). Steenberg subcontracted 
this same work to the neophyte M&S for $754,579.00, 
more than $170,000.00 lower. The Bureau of Reclama-
tion published, after the bidding, as was its custom in 
such projects, an abstract of bids showing the Bureau of 
Reclamation Engineer's estimate, made before the bid-
ding (but not then made public), and the various bids 
received from contractors, both in total amount and item 
by item <T-147, EX. N). Of the $800,000 difference be-
tween Steenberg and the next low bidder, Morrison-Knud-
son, $687,000.00 was in the subcontract items alone; 
$925,903.92 to $1,612,430.00. 
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The M&S subcontract was negotiated and signed 13 
days after the general bid opening (Ex. N, Ex. 1). At 
that time the abstract of bids (Ex. N) was available to 
M&S, but was not reviewed by it. (T-144, 145). 
The Engineer's estimate and the various bids on the 
subcontract items, all of which were available to it at 
the time it signed the sub-contract, were (Ex. N): 
Subcontract Items 
Engineer's official cost estimate ____________________ $ l ,565,848.00 
( M&S) ------------------------------------------------------------ 754,579.00 
Steenberg Construction Company, 
St. Paul, Minnesota__________________________________________ 925,903.92 
Morrison-Knudson Co., Inc., Boise, Idaho ____ 1,612,430.00 
0. K. Wittry & Sons, Gardena, California ____ 1,782,711.00 
Foley Brothers, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota 
and Holland Construction Co., Billings, 
Montana <Joint venture)------------------------------ 1, 718,251.00 
R. A. Heintz Construction Co. 
Portland, Oregon -------------------------------------------- 1,836,991.60 
W. W. Clyde & Co., Springville, Utah ________ 1,934,632.00 
Fife Construction Co., Brigham City, Utah 1,865,048.02 
Soliba-Kringlen Corp., Gardena, California 2,170,265.00 
Norman T. Fadel, Inc., 
North Hollywood, California ________________________ 2,285,819.84 
Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co. 
Seattle, Washington -------------------------------------- 2,305,979.00 
MacN amera Corp., Burlingame, California 2,503, 172.00 
Thus it is to be seen that the M&S bid was not only 
$170,000 below the Steenberg bid, but over $850,000 
below the next low bidder. 
One further comment on relative prices may be use-
ful. There were six major earth moving items in the sub-
contract, Nos. 4, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 64. The comparison 
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of unit prices per cubic yard on these items reflects the 
following (Ex. N, Ex. 1): 
Steenberg Engineer's Next Low 
Item No. M&S Price Price Estimate Bidder (M-K) 
4 .24 .24 1.40 1.28 
I I .19 .22 .40 .40 
I3 .I I .17 .19 .22 
15 .114 .I I .15 .19 
I7 .11 .16 .I7 .19 
64 .15I .I5 .80 .65 
Average price per 
cubic yard .152 .175 .5I8 .488 
Only one of the above items was performed by M&S 
beyond the beginning stage, item 4. At times this work 
was costing about twenty times the bid amount. Of this, 
more will be said later in the damage argument. 
M&S began work on the subcontract in July, I963 
(T-I80). Finding itself unable to pay its bills in August, 
M&S asked Commercial Security Bank of Ogden, Utah, 
for a loan but was referred by that bank to Respondent, 
Clearfield State Bank <T-79). Respondent is a small state 
bank operating in the Clearfield area. 
At this point we are compelled to take sharp excep-
tion to Appellant's assertion in its brief that Jesse Barlow, 
Executive Vice President of Clearfield State Bank, solicited 
the making of the loans. To examine the citation given 
in Appellant's brief (T-23-24) discloses a vigorous denial 
by Barlow of any solicitation. None of Appellant's wit-
nesses, nor any other witness, testified Barlow solicited 
or initiated the loan negotiations; in fact Mendenhall 
<Treasurer of M&S) characterized the initial approach as 
follows <T-78): 
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"Q. And where did you first meet him? 
A. At his bank, sir. 
Q. And when would that have been, Mr. Men-
denhall? 
A. That would have been in the latter part of 
July of 1963. 
Q. And who was present? 
A. Vern Smith and myself. 
Q. Now, why did you appear at their bank? 
A. We went over there to see if we could obtain 
operating capital for the Lost Creek Dam project." 
After some discussions, Respondent, on August 22, 
1063 loaned Appellant $25,000.00, evidenced by a note 
payable September 15, 1963 (Ex. D) and secured by an 
assignment of funds payable under the Lost Creek sub-
contract (Ex. 2). This initial loan, of the same date as 
the agreement to loan found by the jury, was made over 
two months after the subcontract was signed and one 
month after work under the subcontract had started. 
Some 10 days later M&S was again having financial 
trouble (T-31, 115). On September 3, 1963, at the re-
quest of M&S the bank loaned it an additional $25,000.00, 
evidenced by a note (T-31) due September 15, 1963. 
M&S began having troubles of a major nature in 
<loing the subcontract work. The work was not progres-
sing properly, the payments were not as anticipated, and 
tl1e work was costing far in excess of earnings (T-116, 
119). 
The first monthly draw of $30,429.00 from Steen-
berg, received on or about September 15, 1963, was con-
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siderably less than anticipated, but it nevertheless did 
repay the $25,000.00 borrowed on August 23rd. This 
left unpaid and past due the second loan of $25,000.00 
made on September 3rd. More funds became immedi-
ately necessary to continue the work, and at the request 
of M&S the Respondent made additional loans. 
As of October 23, 1963, when the second Steenberg 
check was received, the Respondent had made six separate 
loans to M&S totaling $112,000.00, of which $60,000.00 
had been repaid. Of the unpaid balance of $52,000.00, 
$27,000.00 was represented by notes that were past due, 
and $25,000.00 was represented by a note that would fall 
due on November 15, 1963 (Ex. E). In addition M&S had 
an overdraft in its general checking account with Respond-
ent. All of these obligations were secured by the Assign-
ment. The work was following a losing pattern, T-122: 
"And all of this time we were getting paid on our 
draws at the rate of 24c a cubic yard, for taking this 
material out. But actually the draglines had to load 
it into scrapers, had to haul it and dump it and dry 
it out, and rehandle it a number of times. That ma-
terial finally, as it got down in the bottom of this, 
with draglines having it out here 60 feet, was becom-
ing perhaps $5.00 a yard material." 
It was at this time Respondent pursuant to the terms 
of its assignment, applied the proceeds of the Steenberg 
check in large measure to obligations owed it (T-46) and 
refused to honor further checks of M&S that did not have 
funds in the account to cover them. Respondent did sub-
sequently loan M&S an additional $11,300 (Exs. L, M) 
but this did not affect the Lost Creek picture as Steenberg 
had then defaulted M&S and had taken over performance 




THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY FINDING OF AN AGREE-
MENT BY RESPONDENT TO FINANCE 
APPELLANT'S LOST CREEK SUB-CONTRACT 
The jury found in response to a special verdict that 
Respondent, on or about August 23, 1963, agreed to lend 
M&S, for the purposes of the Lost Creek sub-contract, an 
amount not to exceed $50,000, by loaning $25,000 on 
August 23, 1963, to be due September 15, 1963, and to 
renew said loan from time to time to the date of final 
payment by Steenberg (R-87). 
Respondent urges that the evidence, as a matter of 
law, was not sufficient to support this finding. The evi-
dence on this point is entirely oral, as none of the docu-
ments contain such an undertaking by Clearfield. The 
testimony was received over Respondent's objections that 
lt violated the parol evidence rule (T-60, 80). The notes 
involved had short term due dates exclusively. M&S as-
serted at trial (T-80) they were showing an agreement to 
finance M&S not contradictory to the written documents. 
Promissory notes are, like any written instrument, 
subject to the rule as set out in Vol. 5, Utah Law Review, 
No. 2, at page 159: 
"Parol evidence is not admissible to vary, add to or 
contradict the terms of a written instrument." 
The alleged agreement is that the notes were to be re-
newed from time to time (R-87) rather than being paid. 
The rule is amplified with particular reference to notes in 
32 A, C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 895, Page 254: 
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"It cannot be shown that the time for the payment of 
the obligation as agreed on by the parties is different 
from the date of maturity as appearing in the instru-
ment, or that there was an agreement at the time of 
making the note that it would be renewed at ma-
turity * * *". 
Confirming this rule are Lincoln National Life Insurance 
Co. v. Bastian, 31 F.2 859, Ford vs. Southern Motor Com-
pany, 93 S. 902. In Garrett vs. Ellison, 93 U. 184, 72 P.2 
449, this court said: 
"The instruments involved in this action (the note 
and mortgage) are contracts between Mrs. Garrett 
and Mrs. Ellison on the one side, and the Brackens on 
the other. It was written to evidence the obligation 
of the Brackens to the payees and fix the terms of the 
contract as between the payors and payees. Those 
terms are manifest from the instruments and may not 
be varied by parol." 
The oral testimony relied on by the jury in finding 
the agreement to renew the loans without question did 
violence to the terms of the notes, and should not have 
been received. Apart from parol evidence, there is the fur-
ther question of whether the testimony, if properly re-
ceived, is sufficient. This evidence consisted solely of the 
testimony of Mendenhall and Stoker, two of the M&S 
principals. 
Stoker testified ( T-113) on this matter as follows: 
"And it was discussed that the Bank would finance us, 
starting out with a $25,000 loan, which would be paid 
with draws from the job as time progressed, and then 
as we needed financing again there would be another 
$25,000 advance made, or as the need arose." 
Stoker thus did not testify there was an agreement to loan 
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$50,000 but only $25,000. He said in reference to the sec-
ond loan: <T-115) 
"And it was discussing the need, and explaining why 
we needed the additional financing, and then ob-
tained this additional $25,000 loan." 
Mendenhall testified <T-80) the bank agreed to loan 
$25,000 on a "continuity" or revolving basis. His com-
plete testimony regarding the figure of $50,000 was as 
follows: 
"Q. <By Mr. Elton) Was there anything said on 
that occasion about the amount that the Bank 
would advance to you? 
"A. I believe there was, yes. 
"Q. What was that? 
"A. Well, prior to this meeting-
"Q. Yes. 
"A. <Continuing)-Mr. Stoker had been in and 
talked with Mr. Barlow. And they'd found out 
more about this job. 
"Mr. Olmstead: If the Court please-
"Q. <By Mr. Elton) Well, you weren't present at this 
one then? 
"A. Well, no sir. 
"Q. Well, then all right. 
Now, on this one we were talking about, was 
anything else said? 
"A. This twenty-five thousand had been increased 
to fifty thousand." 
This, of course, is attempted testimony by Menden-
liall to something that happened, if at all, at another time 
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and place (when he was not present). There is a com-
plete absence of testimony from any source that Barlow or 
any other bank officer, agreed to loan appellant $50,000 
for the entire length of the Steenberg sub-contract, which 
is the only contract found by the jury. 
In direct refutation of any commitment to loan mon-
eys over the term of the subcontract was the testimony of 
Respondent's officers, Jesse Barlow (T-12, 219), Walter 
Steed <T-224), Harold Steed (T-232), and Claire Neilsen, 
M&S Accountant (T-236). 
We make no claim that the jury was bound to ac-
cept the testimony of Respondent's officers. We do say 
that M&S had the burden of proof to show the existence 
of the alleged agreement, and this burden was never met 
by the evidence. If the parol evidnce rule is recognized, 
there is a complete absence of any evidence of the alleged 
agreement. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE JURY TO 
HAVE BEEN MADE BY RESPONDENT IS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The prohibition of the statute 25-5-4 ( 1), U.C.A. 
1953, is clear. If an agreement by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year, it falls within the confines of 
the statute. The terms of the agreement, as alleged by 
M&S (R-3) and found by the jury <R-87) provide in part: 
"* * * the same to be thereafter renewed from time to 
time to the date of final payment by Steenberg * * *" 
Exhibit B, the suhcontract, states 
"Subcontractor agrees work must be completed and 
accepted before final payment." 
Further, it provides that the work is, 
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"To be performed in approximate accord with final 
approved progress schedule. Starting time shown on 
Progress Schedule for each year to be governed by 
high water conditions." 
The evidence of time for completion of the work was 
offered by Emil Walsh, Vice President of Steenberg <T-
74, 75), a witness called by Appellant. He stated the time 
provided in the contract was 880 days, or three construc-
tion seasons. The work done by M&S was commenced in 
July of 1963 (T-180) and continued until November 4, 
i 963. Then Steenberg took over, and diligently prosecuted 
the sub-contract work until September of 1965 <T-75), 
more than 2 years, and was then unfinished. In Walsh's 
opinion, the fastest the work could have been accom-
plished under optimum conditions was two years <T-75). 
No other evidence of the time required for comple-
tion of the sub-contract, the main contract, or of the time 
of "final payment" was adduced. 
We agree with Appellant's contention that "by its 
terms" refers to the agreement to loan, not to the sub-
contract. This does not, however, evade the barrier of 
the statute, because of the agreement to lend "and to re-
new said loan from time to time to the date of final pay-
ment by Steenberg Construction Company." Accordingly, 
the agreement to lend is co-existent with the duration of 
the sub-contract as both run to date of "final payment". 
The evidence appears clear: 
(a) The agreement to loan continued to completion 
and acceptance of the entire sub-contract work; 
(b) The agreement to loan was not one that could 
be performed within one year, because the sub-
contract could not be so performed. 
13 
Appellant suggests to this court two separate but 
similar avenues of escape from the statute. First, it is 
claimed that since M&S was not forbidden to complete the 
work within one year the contract is not within the statute. 
We will agree that this court, like the courts in the major-
ity of states, has liberally construed the statute. However, 
this does not mean explicit terms of agreements have been 
ignored in an aura of "anything is possible", such as Ap-
pellant suggests. 
This statute has been part of our common law heri-
tage for several hundred years, and deserves better. The 
criteria is what can "fairly and reasonably be said to have 
been within the contemplation of the parties * * *". 37 
C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of, Sec. 50. 
A proper construction of the Statute will decide the 
question of length of time of performance "according to 
the reasonable interpretation of its terms * * *", War-
ner v. Texas and Pacific R. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 41 L. Ed. 
495, 175 Ct. 147. The test is not, as Appellant contends, 
whether the contract forbids performance within one year; 
the test is whether it is one of those "* * ** agreements 
which, fairly and reasonably interpreted, do not admit of 
a valid execution within the year * * *". Hellings v. 
Wright, 29 Cal. App. 649, 156 P. 365. 
Stated another way, in 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds, 
Sec. 50, 
"The possibility of performance within one year must 
be such as can fairly and reasonably be said to have 
been within the contemplation of the parties; an un-
foreseen or remote possibility is not sufficient." 
Williston on Contracts (cited by Appellant) Section 
500, amplifies this view: 
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"Sec. 500. Contracts not intended to be performed 
within a year. 
"Another fine but important distinction is between: 
"l. A contract which can be performed, as the par-
ties intend that it shall be performed, within a year, 
though they fully expect that performance will take 
a longer period and 
"2. A contract which cannot be performed within a 
year, as the parties intend and expect that it shall be 
performed, though performance in a different way 
within that time is conceivably possible and if so 
made would satisfy the literal words of the contract. 
"Contracts of the first sort are not within the Statute; 
those of the second sort are held at least by many 
courts to be within the Statute. The opinion of the 
parties as to the time which a given performance will 
take is immaterial, but if their mutual intentions as 
to the method cannot possibly be carried out within 
a year, the fact that another method which would 
satisfy the legal obligation is logically conceivable 
will not save the contract." 
"Thus a contract to do construction or engineering 
work which can only be fulfilled within a year by 
abnormal and unusual methods not within the con-
templation of the parties has been held within the 
statute." (Emphasis added) 
Browne on Statute of Frauds, page 327, Sec. 273, 4th 
Ed. cited in Stanley v. Levy, Nev., 112 P. 2d 1047, states: 
"The result (of decisions) seems to be that the statute 
does not mean to include an agreement which is sim-
ply not likely to be performed, nor yet one which is 
simply not expected to be performed, within the space 
of a year from the making; but that it means to in-
clude any agreement which, by a fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the terms used by the parties, and 
in view of all the circumstances existing at the time, 
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does not admit of performance according to its lan-
guage and intention, within a year from the time of 
its making." 
In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court further held: 
"We think that the possibility of performance which 
vvould take an agreement out of the statute of frauds 
must be such as could fairly and reasonably be said 
to have been within the contemplation of the parties. 
An unforeseen or remote possibility will not rescue 
the agreement from invalidity." 
Thus, in Markowitz Brothers, Inc., vs. Volpe, 209 F. 
Supp. 339, 1962, a factual situation similar to the instant 
was held within the statute: 
"Performance of this sub-contract concluded, if at 
all, on January 18, 1962, could not even begin until 
some indefinite future date. The work was of a type 
which was to extend for nearly, if not all, of the time 
of the main contract. The main contract itself con-
templated that completion should be within 660 days, 
and while it could have been possible to complete it 
within a year, upon a three shift priority basis, it was 
not contemplated by the Government, the general or 
the sub-contractor that it should be so completed." 
The case of Gronvald u. Whaley, 39 Wash. 2710, 237 
P. 2d 1026, relied upon by Appellant, is factually dissimi-
lar from the present. In that case, the agreement was to 
continue until the enterprise was successful. Independent 
evidence showed the enterprise probably would not be 
successful until a certain dam was completed, and also af-
firmatively showed that the dam could be completed in 
less than one year. In such a case, the court merely held 
that performance was indeed possible. In our case, the 
uncontradicted evidence shows the project could not be 
completed within one year, the reverse of Gronvald. 
16 
Again, Commercial Security Bank vs. Hodson, 15 U. 
2d 388, 393 P. 2d 482, is factually dissimilar. As quoted 
by Appellant (Page 15, App. Brief) "The exact length of 
time this loan should last is not specified * * * ." In the 
present case the length of time is specifically set out-to 
"final payment"-some three years hence. 
The second argument advanced by Appellant is the 
"as and when required" argument. It is suggested by 
Appellant that it is here bolstered by language contained 
in Zions Service Corporation vs. Danielson, 12 U. 2d 369, 
366 P. 2d 982. In reality, the reverse is true. The distinc-
tion is covered by Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Vol. 
2, Sec. 498: 
"Promises subject to an express defeasance or pro-
viding for alternative performance. The distinction 
between an excuse for not performing and comple-
tion of performance * * * is taken in contracts re-
quiring for their performance a period exceeding a 
year but which are subject to a right of defeasance, 
not by operation of law but by the express terms of 
the contract, within the period of a year, as a con-
tract for several years' service containing a provision 
permitting termination by either party on a week's 
or month's notice. Such contracts are generally held 
within the Statute." 
Coan v. Prosinger, C.C.A. District of Columbia, 1959, 
265 F. 2d 575, considers this point: 
"That contingency contemplates an annulment of 
the terms of the contract and would operate as a de-
feasance, thereby terminating and discharging the 
contract. Further performance under the contract 
would be impossible by either party. This annulment 
or defeasance provision does not contemplate the per-
formance of the contract but only its termination and 
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cancellation. Although it could be annulled within 
a year, it was none the less a personal service contract 
to last for more than a year, e.g., until appellant com-
pleted his studies at Georgetown University Law 
School. Although this annulment or defeasance pro-
vision relieves the parties from further performance 
of the contract, it is not the type of performance that 
is necessary to take the case out of the operation of 
the statute." 
Another Circuit Court case, Blue Valley Creamery 
vs. Consolidated Products, 8th C.C.A., 81 F. 2d 182, re-
views this distinction: 
"It is generally held that a contract for a definite pe-
riod extending over a year is not taken out of the stat-
ute by an option allowing either party to terminate 
it within a year. The performance contemplated by 
the statute is a full and complete performance and 
a cancellation is not such a performance. (Cases 
Cited) 
"Much of the confusion in considering the applica-
bility of the statute apparently arises from failing to 
keep in mind the distinction between a contingency 
of such a nature as fulfills the obligation and one that 
defeats or prevents it from being performed. The one 
that depends upon the defeasance or matter of avoid-
ance is within the statute, while the other is not." 
This view is adopted by the 5th Circuit in Stahlman 
v. National Lead Company, <1963), 318 F. 2d 388: 
"Under Mississippi law and the weight of authority, 
an oral contract, which, by its terms, is not to be per-
formed within the statutory period (here, 15 months) 
or where the parties intend that it shall continue in 
operation beyond the statutory period, is not taken 
without the Statute by a provision that it may be 
terminated by either party within such period. In 
Fireman's Fund Inc. Co. vs. Williams, 170 Miss. 199, 
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154 So. 545, 546, the court said, with respect to a con-
tract which could be terminated on 10 days' notice 
by either party, 'the termination of such a contract 
is not performance of it, but is a mere frustration 
thereof.' " 
Further 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds, Sec. 48: 
"It is generally held that a contract for a definite 
period extending over a year is not taken out of the 
statute by an option allowing either party to termi-
nate it within a year. The reasons underlying this 
view are that, since the performance contemplated by 
the statute is full and complete performance, supra 
Sec. 42, a rescission or cancellation of a contract is 
not a performance of it." 
This view is set out as the ruling law by the Restate-
ment of Contracts, Sec. 198 (specifically relied upon by 
this court in the Danielson decision), Comment C: 
"C. A distinction must be taken between promises 
which can be 'fully performed' within a year and 
promises which though they cannot be 'fully per-
formed' within that time may be excused within it 
by the happening of some event. The former class 
is not within Class V; the latter class is." 
To illustrate this distinction, the Restatement pro-
vides two examples, Nos. 2 and 3 in Sec. 198: 
"2. A orally promises to work for B, and B promises 
to employ A during A's life at a stated salary. The 
promises are not within Class V. A's life may termi-
nate within a year. 
"3. A orally promises to work for B, and B promises 
to employ A for thirteen months at a stated salary. 
The promises are within Class V. Though A may 
die within a year, and the duties of the parties there-
by cease, he will not have performed his promise." 
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We submit this view is the logical interpretation of 
the Statute. The Utah cases cited by Appellant do no vio-
lence to this position; in Johnson vs. Johnson, 31 U. 408, 
88 P. 230, the contract would be "fully performed" at 
death because the contract was to be "for life"; in Dan-
ielson (supra) the contract was again "fully performed" 
since it was a contract for an indeterminate period, obli-
gating the plaintiff to pay dues only as long as he chose 
to remain a member of the group. There was not, as in 
the present case, an obligation on defendant extending be-
yond the period of one year. 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Eastern States Re-
frigerating Co. vs. Teasdale, 211 S.W. 693, found a con-
tract obligating plaintiff to supply storage in excess of one 
year within the statute, although defendant may have 
removed the stored supplies within one year: 
"Learned counsel for appellant argues that the agree-
ment might perhaps be performed within a year from 
its date, as, for instance, by the defendant having 
stored the apples for a period of time and having 
taken them out of storage within less than a year, and 
not having stored any supplies with the plaintiff 
thereafter. This, however, is not sufficient to bring 
the agreement within the exception, namely, that 
class of cases which may be performed within a year 
from the date thereof consistently with its terms, and 
not in violation thereof, and thus not be within the 
terms of the statute, such as a contract to support 
one for life, during an indefinite period, or to do any 
other thing possible to be done within a year, al-
though the doing of it may continue for a period 
longer than a year. We are of the opinion, and so 
hold, that this agreement fixes a definite period dur-
ing which plaintiff was bound to furnish storage, and 
that such period is longer than one year, and that 
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therefore the agreement requires more than a year 
for its performance." CEmphasis added) 
Similarly, in 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of, Section 46: 
"* * * and where the contract imposes a continuing 
obligation on one party for the contractual period, of 
more than a year, the fact that the other party might 
perform his part of the contract within a year does 
not take the contract out of the statute." 
The agreement found to exist obligated Respondent 
to loan up to $50,000 to appellant for a fixed term far in 
excess of one year. If this agreement were held without 
the Statute, it is difficult indeed to conceive of an agree-
ment that would be prohibited. Any agreement can be 
halted by one of the parties terminating within a year, yet 
certainly this is not "performance" as contemplated by the 
statute. Accordingly, we submit the trial court did not 
err in granting judgment to Respondent as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE 
$38,852.54 STEENBERG CHECK NOT TO BE 
A SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR DEPOSIT IN TRUST 
The letter fully set out in Appellant's Brief at Page 
17 was received in evidence over Respondent's objections 
(T-42) that it was hearsay and immaterial. These objec-
tions were well taken, as the letter was not seen, composed 
or approved by either Appellant or Respondent. It was 
written by Walsh, an agent of Steenberg and a stranger 
to the lawsuit. In fact, the letter asks that Respondent not 
divulge the letter or its contents to Appellant. (Ex. 1). 
This letter is clearly hearsay, and as such is subject to the 
rule excluding the utterances of third parties as evidence. 
As is noted in 20 Am. Jur. Evidence, Sec. 455: 
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"The general rule which excludes hearsay as evidence 
applies to written, as well as oral, statements. In 
other words, documentary evidence may be hearsay 
and inadmissible as such unless an exception to the 
hearsay rule renders the document admissible." 
The letter is at most a request for the benefit of Steen-
berg, as Steenberg might be responsible for debts on the 
job unpaid by its subcontractor. But, as the authorities 
will show, Steenberg had no standing or legal right to 
make such a request. Again, it was not a request for or on 
behalf of M&S, as under the assignment M&S could not 
make such a request and was factually not even aware of 
it. W c think clearly the letter was hearsay, immaterial 
and prejudicial in this case, and the trial court erred in 
admitting it over objection. 
The endorsement placed on the check by Steenberg 
<Ex. f-1) in no way relates to a special deposit or trust fund. 
It may constitute a certification by M&S that it had paid 
all its September bills on the project. There was no evi-
dence this was not indeed the fact, as all of the evidence 
on this subject relates to October bills. Accordingly, the 
check endorsement adds nothing to Appellant's claimed 
"trust fund" theory. 
Further, it is obvious that the moneys owed Respond-
ent were "bills" under the terms of the endorsement, as 
the moneys loaned by Respondent had paid the costs of 
the project to that time. (See Ex. N, bills of Lost Creek 
paid through Clearfield State Bank). Certainly, it is not 
a diversion to repay funds borrowed and used for operat-
ing costs on the project in question. 
We do not quarrel with the general assertion that a 
deposit may, under certain circumstances, be a deposit for 
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a special purpose. We do say that under the subcontract 
and assignment, the Steenberg check to M&S and Re-
spondent was not a special deposit. This factual situation 
has been reviewed by the courts many times, with the con-
sistent result that progress payments made to a subcon-
tractor are not encumbered by a trust and are available for 
application as the sub-contractor sees fit. Since the pay-
ment had been assigned to Respondent, it had the right to 
apply these funds to obligations of M&S owed the Re-
spondent. 
Utah has steadfastly upheld the universal rule that 
payments made to a subcontractor are free of any trust or 
conditions. Utah State Building Comm. vs. Great Amer-
ican Indemnity, 105 U. 11, 140 P. 2d 763, is a case in 
point. This involved the contractor's attempt to require a 
materialman to use proceeds of the subcontract to pay 
debts incurred on the job he was paid for. This court re-
jected the contention, holding: 
"Most contractors and subcontractors must necessa-
rily use some of the proceeds of current contracts in 
paying other obligations. It would improperly fetter 
business transactions unless they had the right to re-
ceive and deal with their earnings as they saw fit, 
and for third parties to accept their money free from 
hidden equities. It would be extremely impractical 
for the materialman dealing with a contractor to be 
under the necessity of inquiring into the source of the 
money paid him, and equally impractical to require 
the materialman to apply the money to any partic-
ular job, unless he knew the source of it. 
"In this case, Campion was, by his contract, respon-
sible for payment of the materials purchased by Sar-
gent, and he could with propriety, have required Sa:-
crent to furnish a bond to guarantee payment. It 1s 
0 
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also true that when Campion paid Sargent, the lat-
ter could have spent the money for food or clothing 
for his family, or for an automobile for his private 
use, or for any other purpose, and no complaint could 
have been made." 
In keeping with this opinion, it should be noted that 
under the sub-contract (Ex. 1) Steenberg had the right to 
require a bond from M&S, just as Campion could have re-
quired a bond from Sargent. 
These moneys are distinguished from the retained 1 
proceeds of the job (which are subject to the claim of la-
borers and suppliers) as the retainage is not for the bene-
fit of the subcontractor, but for the protection of his cred-
itors and, concurrently, the contractor. See Third Na-
tional Bank of Miami vs. Detroit Fidelity and Surety, 5th 
C.C.A., 65 F. 2d 548, Farnsworth v. Electric Supply Com-
pany, 5th C.C.A., 112 F. 2 150, Town of River Junction v. 
Maryland Casualty Co., 5th C.C.A. 110 F.2, 278, and the 
leading case Kane v. First National Bank, 5th C.C.A., 56 
F.2 534. 
In the Kane case, a surety sought to recover progress 
payment checks deposited in the contractor's bank, which 
deposits the bank set off (after learning of the contractor's 
insolvency) against obligations owed the bank. The Court 
said, in holding in favor of the bank: 
"Money or checks paid to him as the work progresses 
are the property of the contractor unencumbered by 
any trust, just as are payments to others for goods 
manufactured or services performed. The Contrac-
tor's banker may receive such checks and is not bound 
to see to their application, nor to ascertain the state 
of the contractor's account with each contract; nor, if 
he knows it, need he govern himself in anywise with 
reference thereto." 
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This line of authority, and the Kane case, have been 
recently followed and approved by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in American Casualty Company of Read-
ing, Pennsylvania, v. Line Materials Industries, May 1964, 
reported at 332 (f2) 393. In this case, the surety sought 
to recover a payment made to a creditor of the contractor, 
under an assignment made by the contractor to the cred-
itors to satisfy a pre-existing debt. The monies paid were 
from a progress payment on a project that surety was re-
quired to take over and complete at great loss to itself. The 
Court said: 
"This is simply a case where the owner of a project 
paid a sum of money due on the contract to the con-
tractor at a time when the contractor was not in de-
fault. It was free money and the contractor had the 
right to use it in any way he chose without it being 
subject to any claim or equity of his surety. Bassick 
did use it to pay an obligation that did not arise from 
his performance of the contract in question. But, he 
had a legal right to do so as the Appellant surety com-
pany, at that time, was not subrogated to the rights 
of anyone concerned with the contract and had no 
valid claim to the money." 
"The rule applicable here is succinctly stated in 4 
Corbin on Contracts, Section 901, p. 609: 'As long 
as the contractor has committed no vital breach, he 
has a right to payments as provided in the contract; 
and his assignee will have as good a right to these 
payments as did the contractor. As long as the con-
tractor is performing as agreed, the owner must pay 
as agreed; and the surety has no right, by subroga-
tion that the payments shall be withheld. After 
bre~ch by the contractor, the situation changes.' " 
In the present case, Appellant must rest upon the premise 
it was not in default prior to receipt of the check. If the 
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opposite were true, whatever Respondent did or did not 
do vvotdd have nu hearing on the demise of M&S. Accord-
ingly, under the law as we have outlined it, Respondent, 
as assignee of M&S, had the absolute, not conditional, 
right to these funds. 
Appellant now brings the "trust fund" theory to this 
court on its own, i.e., in the light of no concurrent agree-
ment to loan of any type. It is then argued the measure 
and extent of damage attributable to the claimed wrongful 
diversion is identical with that claimed from the breach of 
an agreement to loan. This is equally erroneous as its ini-
tial premise that the check was a special deposit. 
Appellant is complaining not of diversion of the en-
tire check, as some $7,000.00 went into the M&S checking 
account; but of the $25,000.00 applied on a past due note, 
$2,000.00 applied on a then due note, and $4,000.00 ap-
plied on a note not by its terms due until November 15, 
1963. Thus, the claimed diversion is $31,000.00 not 
$38,000.00. 
If this $31,000.00 had not been paid upon the notes 
in question, it could have been used to pay other bills. But 
this in no manner is of aid to M&S because they are in de-
fault to the extent of $27,000.00 to Respondent, with an-
other $25,000.00 due three weeks hence (November 15). 
It becomes a matter of choosing which creditor to pay, 
when the funds available are woefully short of meeting 
the current obligations. Absent an agreement to renew all 
of the loans, which is certainly not the agreement found 
by the jury tu have been made, and which M&S has never 
heretofore asserted, M&S is in default, and insolvent, with-
out regard tu which of the creditors are paid. 
We su brni t the evidence shows without question a 
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valid assignment of moneys that were not encumbered or 
restricted. If the reverse were true, no lender would ever 
advance monies on the strength of an assignment, because 
he would be the last person entitled to payment, following 
suppliers, materialmen, and anyone else dealing with his 
assignor on the job. The trial court correctly ruled that 
Respondent had the right to apply the funds in the man-
ner it did. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT ON 
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES 
Appellant's complaint (R-1) asked damages against 
Respondent of $500,000 general damages for good will and 
reputation loss, $318,000 special damages and $100,000 
exemplary damages, a total of $918,000.00. At pre-trial 
(R-36) the exemplary claim was eliminated, and at trial 
(R-92) the claim for general damages was taken out by 
court's instruction No. 22. The remaining claim for dam-
age of $318,00 was submitted to the jury by instruction 
No. 18 solely on the question of anticipated profits <R-88). 
The jury found this actual damage to be $156,000. Re-
spondent asserts it was entitled to a directed verdict, or 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on each of two 
[ acets of the damage issue: 
(a) Causation, or fact of damage; 
(b) Amount of damage. 
(a) It is critical to keep one paramount fact in mind 
while looking to the damage question. The Steenberg sub-
contract was signed by Appellant, and work commenced 
thereunder, long before it approached Respondent to seek 
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a loan. This is not, as in Commercial Security Bank vs. 
Hod~cm, supra, a situation where plaintiff claims it was 
induced to commit itself upon the promise of financial 
backing. The damages recoverable in one situation are far 
different than in the other, i.e., a plaintiff may in the lat-
ter case be en Litled to recover for moneys expended, or 
commitments made on the strength of an agreement to 
loan; whereas in the former case the moneys have been 
expended, and the commitments made without regard to 
the promise of financing. 
Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty, 
15 Am. fur. Damages, Sec. 20, Telluride Power Company 
vs. Williams, 10th C.C.A. Utah, 172 F.2 673. The burden 
·was upon Appellant to show first, the fact of damage, and 
second, the amount. Dee vs. San Pedro, 50 U. 167, 167 P. 
246. 
The collapse of M&S was assured at the time it signed 
the subcontract of June 17, 1963, for no amount of financ-
ing would save a losing job of this size. To hold Respond-
ent accountable for the default, M&S had the burden of 
showing, by competent evidence, that if Respondent had 
continued to loan it up to $50,000, M&S would have com-
pleted the contract \vithout default. 
The next payment from the job was not due until the 
latter part of November, and would have been in the 
amount of $24,832.77 (Ex. 0, October earnings less 10% 
retainage). Could M&S survive until then? Appellant of-
fered no evidence to show what moneys would be neces-
sary to keep the job moving and the bills paid. However, 
some figures are available, such as the $14,188.69 in ac-
crued payroll that was met by Steenberg <Ex. N). Further 
payroll after October 24th would have to be made, and 
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this was running at the rate of $4,000.00 per week CEx. 
N). 
Withholding taxes are due and payable the month 
following the calendar quarter in which earned, 26 U.S.-
C.A. 6071 (a), and M&S would have to pay taxes on or 
before October 31, 1963, for the payroll of July, August 
and September. This payroll was roughly $43,000.00 rnx. 
N). No evidence was given as to the amount of tax due, 
hut the statute requires a deduction of 18%, 26 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 3402, making a withholding tax due by M&S before 
the end of October, 1963, of approximately $7,800.00. To 
restate, over $14,000.00 was then due to workmen, and 
$7,800.00 to the Internal Revenue Service. 
We point out that Appellant did receive a substantial 
part of the $38,000.00 Steenberg check <T-46); if Re-
spondent had re-loaned up to $50,000.00 to Appellant, it 
would have provided only some $29,000.00 (Ex. E), the 
difference between $50,000.00 and the outstanding bal-
ance of loans. Of this $29,000.00, $22,000.00 was then 
due on payroll and withholding taxes. This would leave 
M&S $7,000.00 Oess than 2 weeks payrolD to keep the 
company going for another month, with payroll, equip-
ment rentals, insurance premiums, overhead, purchase 
contracts, supplies, and any other bills that were incurred 
and unpaid, together with accruing costs. 
Certainly this does not meet the burden of proof to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that M&S could have 
stayed on the job and avoided default. Considering the 
lack of evidence, it is speculation alone that would lead to 
such a conclusion. 
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(b) The assessment of damages by the jury was 
based upon claimed lost profits of M&S on the Lost Creek 
subcontract. The law is clear on the evidenciary require-
ments to support an award for lost profits: 
15 Am. fur. Damages, Sec. 150: 
"As in the case of damages generally to warrant a re-
covery for loss of profits in actions either for breach 
of contract or tort, they must be capable of proof with 
reasonable certainty, and no recovery can be had for 
loss of profits which are uncertain, contingent, con-
jectural, or speculative. Thus, no recovery can be had 
for loss of profits where it is uncertain whether any 
profit at all would have been made by the plaintiff 
* * * 
"It has been said that the most definite rule that can 
be drawn from the cases would seem to be that if by 
any chance or under any condition of affairs then 
existing the profits might not have accrued though 
the wrongful act had not intervened, there can be no 
allowance of profits lost as damages; * * *" 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2, 367, 393 P. 2d 468: 
"But their offer of proof was not of that character. 
It was that they could have sold the milk base for 
$3,000 and have turned the money into beef cattle 
sufficient to operate the ranch on a profitable basis 
and to have paid the required payments and taxes. 
Under the well settled rule that damages for antici-
pated profits are contingent upon so many uncertain-
ties that they are speculative and therefore not recov-
erable, Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P. 2d 
532, the trial court was justified in rejecting the offer 
and holding that the Van Zyverdens had proved no 
damage." 
Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 U. 480, 260 P. 532: 
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"* * * before special damages for loss of profits to a 
general business occasioned by the wrongful acts of 
another may be recovered, it must be made to appear 
that the business had been in successful operation for 
such a period of time as to give it permanency and 
recognition, and that such business was earning a 
profit which could be reasonably ascertained and 
approximated." 
Wendell vs. Ross, 245 S.W. 2d 689: 
"But this court and our courts of appeals have been 
strict in their evaluation of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence warranting a recovery of damages for loss of 
profits. Beginning with the early case of Taylor v. 
Maguire, 12 Mo. 313, followed by the later case of 
Callaway Mining and Mfg. Co. vs. Clark, 32 Mo. 305, 
loc. cit. 310, and by Steffen v. Mississippi River & 
Bonne Terre Railway Co., 156 Mo. 322, 56 S.W. 
1125, down to the late case of United Iron Works v. 
Twin City Ice & Creamery Co., 317 Mo. 125, 295 
S.W. 109, this court uniformly has refused to permit 
a jury to speculate as to what might be probable or 
expected profits as an element of damages. Reference 
is made to the United Iron Works case, supra, 317 
Mo. loc. cit. 135, et seq. 295 S.W. 109, for a review of 
the cases on this point. Under the facts and the rul-
ings of those cases, anticipated profits are recoverable 
only when they are made reasonably certain by proof 
of actual facts which present data for a rational esti-
mate of such profits." <Emphasis added) 
The requirements are not met if a party does not pre-
sent his best evidence, Molyneaux vs. Twin Falls Canal 
Company, Idaho, 35 P. 2d 651, Lee v. Durango Music, 
355 P. 2d 1083. In the case of Gilmartin v. Stevens Ins. 
Co., Wash. 261 P. 2d 73, the court said: 
"What is 'reasonable' certainty depends largely on 
the extent to which the particular damage in issue is 
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susceptible of accurate proof. Where, for example, 
the plaintiff, in attempting to prove loss of profits, 
fails to produce available records relevant to that 
question, he fails to meet this standard of reasonable 
certainty." 
In the present case, obviously the best evidence would 
be the company records of costs and earnings while on the 
job. The earnings requirement is satisfied by Ex. 0, the 
Bureau of Reclamation figures. This shows total earn-
ings <including the retainage) of $94,798.74 at the sub-
contract prices. The next question is what this work cost 
M&S. They produced no records to show the cost of this 
work. We have a start from Ex. N, showing the sums paid 
by or for M&S to do this work, $114,318.60. This exhibit 
is entitled "Costs Advanced" and represents only that part 
of the costs that were actually paid, it does not purport to 
show the actual costs incurred. Of course, M&S paid no 
hills after October 22, 1963 (T-134). The Copper State 
Credit statement of $4,100 was never paid (T-208). Pay-
roll withholding taxes were never paid (Ex. N, page 3). 
Overhead expenses attributable to Lost Creek were never 
set out, although total overhead costs for the Lost Creek 
period of time of roughly $10,000 were paid in addition to 
the $114,318.60 figure. $592.00 upon an equipment pay-
ment to Respondent, paid from the last check is not in Ex. 
N. No effort was made by M&S to let the jury know what 
costs (in ad di ti on to the bills paid) were incurred but un-
paid during the time it earned $94,798.74 on the project. 
This burden of proof, to show cost of doing the work, is 
upon Appellant and not Respondent. Am. fur. Proof of 
Facts, Damage~. Vol. 3, Page 612; Annotation 17 A.LR. 
2d, page 968, at page 988: 
"It is therefore hdd that in an action on such a con-
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tract it is the plaintiff's burden to give the jury the 
necessary data from which they can compute dam-
ages; and that this consists of, first, the contract price, 
and second, the cost of performance." 
Appellant's proof on the question of lost profits was 
solely with Stoker, who on redirect examination was al-
lowed to testify (over objection) that when the subcon-
tract was signed he estimated they would earn $230,000 
profit on the job (T-163). Respondent's motion to strike 
this testimony CT-169) was denied by the trial court. The 
vice of this evidence is twofold. 
Initially, it is nothing more than estimate, not facts. 
Cases uniformly hold that opinion, whether of an owner 
or expert, will not support a verdict for damages unless it 
is based upon facts in evidence. Red-E Gas v. Meadows, 
360 S.W. 2d 236; Yaffe v. American Fixture, 345 S.W. 2d 
195 Mo.; White River Levee v. McWilliams, 8th C.C.A., 
supra; Bingham Coal & Lumber v. Board of Education, 
Utah, 61U.149, 211P.981; Tillis v. CalvineCottonMills, 
N.C., 111 So. E. 2d 606; Haddad vs. Western Contracting, 
76 F. Supp. 987; Guidry v. Swayne & Miller, 47 S. 2d 721, 
La.; Autrey v. Williams & Dunlap, 5th C.C.A., 343 F.2d 
730; Lockwood Grader Corp. vs. Backhaus, 270 P. 2d 193, 
Colo.; Lee v. Durango Music, Colo. supra; Fireside Marsh-
mallow Co. vs. Quinlan Construction Co., 8th C.C.A., 213 
F.2d 16; United States v. Griffith et al, 210 F. 2d 11, 10th 
C.C.A., Utah; National School Studios vs. Superior School 
Photo, 242 P2 756; Boggs v. Duncan, 121 S.E. 2nd 359 
Va. 
The Tillis case, supra, held plaintiff's testimony that 
a certain amount would have been earned as profit but for 
the breach to be insufficient, saying: 
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"There is no evidence as to the costs and expenses in-
volved in the hauling of the goods. In order to arrive 
at a reasonable conclusion, the jury must hear facts 
with reference to the cost of wages, equipment repair, 
reserve for equipment replacement, gasoline, oil, 
greasing and service equipment, the charge to be paid 
for the use of I.C.C. rights of regular carriers through 
which Tillis must have operated, license and property 
taxes, tolls, social security taxes, cargo and liability 
insurance, workmen's compensation insurance and 
other similar costs." 
This rule is supported by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Bingham Coal & Lumber v. Board of Education, supra. In 
that case plaintiff was allowed to testify he had lost $2,000 
because of defendant's breach. This court held 
"A mere cursory reading, however, of Fell v. U.P.R. 
Co., supra, will show that the damages must be 
proved by a statement of facts, and not by the mere 
conclusion of the witnesses, as was attempted in the 
case at bar. Then again, the items of damage must 
be established by some substantial evidence so that 
the court or jury may have a basis for the amount of 
damages allowed, other than mere conjecture." 
A Fifth Circuit case, Autrey v. Williams & Dunlap, 
supra, held 
"Luther also contends that the record establishes lost 
profits on the uncompleted portion of the contract in 
the amount of $12,989.59. However, we have care-
fully read that portion of the record cited to us (Vol. 
5, pp. 1308-13) and conclude that it does not estab-
lish that he is entitled to profits. That testimony is in 
essence an estimate by Mr. Luther of what his prof-
its would have been had he completed the contract. 
In cases where damages are claimed for having been 
deprived of profits, the contemplated profit must be 
proved to be reasonably certain and not merely con-
34 
jectural or speculative, See Mabry v. Midland Valley 
Lumber Co., 217 La. 877, 47 So. 2d 673, 677 0950), 
or an estimate. Guidry & Swayne v. Miller, 217 La. 
935, 47 So. 2d 721, 723-724 <1950)." 
A Tenth Circuit case arising in Utah, United States 
vs. Griffith, reversed an award of loss of profits based upon 
the testimony of plaintiff's president that it would have 
earned about $5,000 profits but for the defendant's 
actions: 
"Actual damages only may be secured. Those that 
are speculative, remote, uncertain, may not form the 
basis of a lawful judgment. The actual damages 
which will sustain a judgment must be established, 
not by conjectures or unwarranted estimates of wit-
nesses, but by facts from which their existence is log-
ically and legally inferable. The speculations, guesses, 
estimates of witnesses, form no better basis of recov-
ery than the speculations of the jury themselves." 
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 8 Cir. 111 F. 
96, 98. 
Again, 
"What the loss of profits or damages to plaintiff's 
business would be, if any, is pure guess work on the 
part of plaintiff's president and far too speculative to 
sustain a judgment for this claim." 
The problem becomes doubly acute when, as here, 
the initial estimate has been proved wrong by actual ex-
perience. The matter of profits must relate to the time of 
the breach, and the conditions then existing. White River 
Levee Dist. vs. Mc Williams, 40 F. 2d 873; Fuller vs. United 
Electric, 273 P.2 136; Hedin Construction vs. Bowen, 273 
F. 2d 511. In the White River Levee District case, supra, 
the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
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"The claim for future profits is not allowed. The evi-
dence falls short of 'that clear and direct proof which 
the law requires' of a future profit or of the amount 
thereof. One side of the evidence is that this contract 
required excavation of 80,000 cubic yards each month 
and completion, in thirty months, of the estimated 
2,400,000 cubic yards of excavation; that at the end 
of fifteen months only 290,841 cubic yards had been 
excavated; that the new and only dredge on the work 
could not possibly complete the work in contract time; 
that the work, up to cancellation, had been at a loss. 
The other side of the evidence is that other dredges 
could have been put to work, and that the profit on 
the work to be done would have been at the various 
figures put by several witnesses. In the face of the 
undisputed condition at the time of cancellation, we 
are not justified in assessing substantial damages 
upon the bare estimates as to future happenings." 
<Emphasis added) 
What was the undisputed condition in the present 
case at time of cancellation? Earnings were far less than 
anticipated, and costs far in excess of earnings <T-116, 
122). 
M&S at trial attempted to rehabilitate the damage 
question by claiming the additional costs incurred would 
be paid them over the subcontract prices. This is at best 
pure speculation, but deserve closer examination. Such a 
claim if it existed, is by virtue of attachment H of the sub-
contract: 
"(h) On Item No. 4, it is intended that this work be 
done with scrapers. If however, shovel or draglines 
are needed the extra expense is to be paid by Steen-
berg Construction Co." 
Steenberg, both before and after default, denied M&S 
was entitled tu 011y wlditional compensation. <T-101, 103, 
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Ex. F) By endorsement of the two checks (Exs. G & H) 
M&S waived any claim it may have had for extra pay. No 
claim against Steenberg was ever made <T-96), the claim 
if made was made by Steenberg for its own account. Al-
though two years had elapsed at time of trial, Appellant 
offered no evidence as to the existence of a claim, its 
amount, or whether it had been or would be granted. Ap-
pellant's then counsel agreed the claim was "nebulous". 
<T-100). If such a claim ever existed, it apparently would 
be limited to the cost of the "extra expense of shovels or 
draglines". Again, no evidence was offered as to the 
amount of such expense. 
We respectfully urge this court the evidence is not of 
the quality or nature demanded on the question of profits. 
This is brought into sharp relief by the undisputed fact 
that Appellant was losing money with every shovel of dirt 
it moved at Lost Creek. Again, the abstract of bids is rele-
vant <Ex. 2). We do not claim other bids are conclusive of 
the cost of doing work, for on every job there is a low bid-
der. But we do say the extreme disparity between the M&S 
bid and all of the other bidders, is credible and persuading 
evidence that M&S could never have come out whole on 
this job. In view of this evidence, the actual cost vs. earn-
ings picture, and the short (3 months) existence of M&S 
before entering the contract, it is apparent the jury verdict 
was based not on facts, not on evidence, but on specula-
tion, sympathy or prejudice. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
At the outset, it seems clear that if Respondent was 
entitled to Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, it was 
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also at least entitled to a new trial, or to have the ruling 
on the ne\v trial reserved pending appeal of the judgment. 
Since the motion was denied, Respondent feels compelled 
to raise these matters to avoid being foreclosed on them in 
the event this Court should reverse the judgment. There 
are several areas involved, which we will briefly review. 
(a) Error in rulings on admission of evidence. 
( 1) The admission of Stoker's testimony regard-
ing anticipated profits. This was error be-
cause there was no proper foundation 
(prices of equipment, interest, wages, taxes 
etc.) and further because the estimate had 
been proven wrong by actual experience. 
Timely objections (T-163, 164) were made 
to the testimony. 
(2) Admission of oral testimony to show an 
agreement to loan that was at variance with 
the terms of the notes. 
(3) Admission into evidence of Ex. 1, the Steen-
berg letter. 
These matters have all been previously considered 
under separate headings. 
(b) Failure to submit the issue of the Statute of 
Frauds to the jury. Respondent requested the issue be sub-
mitted <R-71) and took exception to the trial court's re-
fusal. <T-246). Our position is that the trial court in its 
judgment correctly ruled as a matter of law the Statute 
did apply; however, and again in the event of reversal of 
the judgment, Respondent was clearly entitled to have the 
jury pass upon whether the agreement found was an 
agreement not to be performed within one year, as it was 
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an issue in the case upon which evidence that it was such 
an agreement had been received. 
(c) Excessive damages appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion and prejudice. It will be re-
called the testimony of Stoker as to anticipated profits re-
lated to the time of signing the subcontract, not the time 
of breach. No evidence as to anticipated profits at time of 
breach was given. It is significant that Pritchett, Attorney 
for M&S at the time of the breach of the subcontract, said 
in regard to profits: (T-89) 
"* * * and that we felt that we would be able to con-
tinue our operations, and perhaps turn a profit, and 
at least come out on the deal, if they could continue 
to work with us." 
We believe this jury verdict of $156,000 was neces-
sarily the result of passion or prejudice against Respond-
ent. Without again reviewing the damage evidence, or 
lack of it, it should be recalled that M&S had a three month 
existence prior to signing the Steenberg sub-contract, and 
no history of successful operation. Its ability to survive 
and prosper in the construction world were untested. The 
profit figure put forward by Stoker, $230,000, is nearly 
one-third of the total bid. The jury reduced this figure to 
$156,000, two-thirds of the claim. To accept this figure 
would mean Appellant could do this work for roughly 
$600,000; yet this same work was bid by the other ten bid-
ders on the project from a low of $1,612,430.00 to a high 
of $2,503, 172.00, from one to two million dollars more 
than the figures apparently accepted by this jury. 
Perhaps these other bids would not be conclusive in 
the face of actual performance that supported the M&S 
bid; but in light of the actual experience of costs over earn-
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ings, the lack of history of M&S, the lack of any credible 
evidence the sub-contract could have been completed at a 
profit, we submit this 6-2 verdict (T-249) could have been 
only the result of passion, sympathy, or prejudice against 
the Respondent bank. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED 
DEFENDANT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANTS 
ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS CLAIM 
The lower court entered judgment against Appellant 
M&S, and Appellant Smith, the signers of the notes evi-
dencing the loans made by defendant to M&S, for the un-
paid balances of such loans. By its Point 3 appellants now 
argue that the entry of such judgment was in error because 
the defendant had either "intentionally or negligently de-
stroyed" the security that defendant held for such loans. 
The premise of the argument is that a pledgee of 
property held as collateral security for a loan has a duty 
to use reasonable care to protect the security, and, failing 
therein, is liable in damages to the pledgor for the damage. 
Accepting arguendo the premise as constituting a fair 
statement of law, namely, that a pledgor of security negli-
gently damaged or destroyed by the pledgee, may set off 
its value in an action on the debt, it is obvious that this 
asserted defense has no relevance in the instant case, as it 
was never raised as an issue in the lower Court. Neither 
by way of pleading, pre-trial, motion during or at conclu-
sion of trial, or even by way of argument to the lower 
court, was it ever suggested that appellants were relying 
on a claim of damages for negligent destruction of property 
as an offset to their liability on the notes. That a defense 
such as this requires affirmative presentation in the lower 
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court is elementary, and we submit that it cannot now be 
raised for the first time. 
Appellants' argument in support of the defense con-
firms, however, the point we have heretofore been urg-
ing, namely, that defendant had the right under its as-
signment to receive and apply as it did the October Steen-
berg check. Let's examine closely the statement of Ap-
pellants in this connection in their brief <Pg. 25): 
"The uncontradicted evidence shows that these al-
leged causes of action were secured by the assign-
ment, Exhibit 'B', and that pursuant to that assign-
ment defendant held as security all of the right of 
plaintiff to receive from Steenberg payment for its 
October, 1963 estimate, plus the 10% retained on 
prior estimates, plus the additional claim for addi-
tional work on the core trench, in addition to its esti-
mated profits on the job, all as referred to by Mr. 
Pritchett <R-87). This security was placed by the 
assignment in the name of the Bank to be held by 
it as collateral security, and it had the exclusive right 
to have and receive the same." <Underscoring 
added) 
No clearer statement of defendant's position in this 
whole case is possible than the foregoing statement by 
appellants themselves. The uncontradicted evidence 
shows that defendant had the right under its assignment 
to receive the October Steenberg payment; that it had a 
security interest in that payment; and it had the exclusive 
right to have and receive the same. 
The October payment was for September work, and 
once that work was performed M&S under its subcontract 
had the unconditional right of payment from Steenberg, 
which right defendant succeeded to under its assignment. 
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Neither appellants nor Steenberg could thereafter condi-
tion defendant's right to the payment, for as appellants 
themselves so aptly phrase it, defendant "had the exclu-
sive right to have and receive the same." 
Having under its assignment the exclusive right to 
the payment, it follows that defendant did not receive the 
same as a "special deposit", and the only question is 
whether defendant's application of the proceeds as it did 
was in accord with the terms of the assignment. 
By the assignment defendant held the proceeds of 
the check as collateral security for obligations owing de-
fendant. Certainly the application of a portion of the 
funds to payment of the overdraft and the past due note 
was proper. The further application of a portion to the 
account of a note not due for another three weeks was 
likewise in order, although the alternative of continuing 
to hold the dollars until the note matured, rather than 
applying them immediately, might likewise have been 
proper. In either event, and as appellants have acknowl-
edged, no one had a greater or prior right than the Bank. 
We submit, accordingly, that there is no merit to ap-
pellants' contention that it is now entitled to a set off as 
against defendant's judgment, however, in urging it they 
have simply confirmed that defendant's receipt and appli-
cation of the Steenberg October check was in all respects 
proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent urges the trial court did not err in order-
ing judgment in favor of Respondent and against Appel-
lant despite tlw verdict of the jury. Such judgment should 
42 
be affirmed on the clear basis that the alleged agreement 
violated the terms of the Statute of Frauds. In addition, 
the evidence as a matter of law was not sufficient to sus-
tain the verdict either as to the existence of the claimed 
agreement, or damage resulting from a breach thereof. 
Alternatively, as we have set out in the brief, if the 
trial court was in error in granting judgment to Respond-
ent, Respondent is clearly entitled to a new trial on all of 
the issues. 
The case of Appellant, if it is to succeed, is depend-
ent upon avoiding established rules of evidence and law. 
Initially, it is the question of showing an oral agreement 
to renew notes that are conclusive on their face as to the 
time for payment. Next, it seeks to sustain the burden of 
proof of an agreement by the testimony of a single witness 
concerning matters that happened in his absence; this in 
the face of four denials under oath of the existence of any 
such agreement. 
Next the Statute of Frauds, wherein it is sought to 
avoid the clear prohibition of this Statute by non-existent 
evidence that the claimed agreement could have been per-
formed in one year. Finally, on to the question of damage; 
wherein appellant sought to prove damage by using an 
estimate made 60 days before the claimed breach and 
proven wrong almost as soon as it was made. 
To allow the verdict to stand is to make vulnerable 
any defendant upon nothing more substantive than the 
conclusions of the other party. This defendant is entitled 
to the safeguards of the law, and to the application of 
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traditional rules that require the plaintiff, before recover-
ing judgment, to prove his case by these standards. 
We respectfully submit this Court should affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLMSTEAD, STINE AND CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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